

An evaluation of HEFCE's Chinese studies initiative

A report to HEFCE by Universitas

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Executive summary

This evaluation was carried out at the request of HEFCE on its initiative to strengthen Chinese studies in English universities. The stimulus for the initiative was the perceived demand, as a result of increasing UK/China business, for graduates with Chinese language skills and business-related knowledge. Funding of some £5m was directed mainly to seven higher education institutions over a five year period in support of the initiative.

We found that the initiative had produced mixed results. Some universities had developed expanded Chinese studies programmes which are recruiting well, leading to increased research output, and which generally show signs of prospering into the future. The additional funding assisted internal university restructurings to create new, cross-disciplinary groupings to deliver the programmes and research. In other cases, though, rather little has been achieved in relation to the funds provided.

We suggest that the initiative's conception and design incorporated a number of weaknesses which, in part, led to the difficulties that some universities encountered. The demand for postgraduate places in Chinese studies (“the major immediate need”, as HEFCE 99/35 put it) was assumed to exist on the basis of limited data. In fact, all universities have found recruitment more or less difficult; and the postulated link with increased UK/China trade has not (so far, at least) been shown to exist to any major extent. Universities' bids in relation to anticipated student numbers were mainly over-optimistic, perhaps in response to the optimistic tone of HEFCE's reports and circulars.

The design of the initiative, requiring universities to bid for funds simultaneously, meant that learning from the successes and failures of others could not occur; that market niches were hard to develop; and that sudden increases in the demand for staff and the provision of student places occurred which were unhelpful for good institutional management. Future initiatives of this kind should be designed so as to provide market signals to suppliers.

The development of the database of China experts, directly funded by HEFCE, has produced limited benefits. It is hard to see what it offers that is significantly superior to what would be found from searching individual university “experts” sites.

HEFCE's overall management of the programme correctly placed maximum responsibility on institutional managements, and, once the initial bidding process was complete, did not place particular burdens on them.

1 Background to the study

1.1 Universitas was invited in May 2004 to tender for an evaluation of HEFCE's Chinese Studies and Minority Subjects initiatives. The Minority Subjects evaluation is the subject of a separate report.

1.2 The Chinese Studies initiative arose from a 1999 review group report of Chinese studies in the UK 'Review of Chinese Studies' (HEFCE 99/09). This report concluded that China now represented an unprecedented challenge and opportunity for UK business, in particular, and that as a result there would be an increase in demand for people with Chinese language skills and understanding of Chinese business, economic, politics, and cultures. This demand should be met, the report proposed, by developments in higher education, in particular through measures "to stabilise and embed provision" in a limited number of existing university centres of Chinese studies.

1.3 As a result, HEFCE formulated a programme, the Chinese Studies initiative, which, after competitive bidding, allocated sums of £150,000 a year for five years, plus additional library funding, to the seven existing main centres of Chinese studies: the Universities of Cambridge, Durham, Leeds, Newcastle, Oxford, Sheffield, and the School of Oriental and African Studies. The main activities were to be the provision of postgraduate conversion programmes, aimed at people without degree-level Chinese language, which was to be taught together with another subject.

1.4 The objective of the initiative was for each beneficiary institution to build student and staff numbers, library resources, and research activity, in order to strengthen or create units which would continue to make an impact beyond the five-year period of funding. Funding was also provided for the establishment and operation of a database of China experts, to make it easier for non-specialists to find the advice they needed about China.

1.5 The terms of reference of the evaluation were, in relation to the objectives of the initiative, to identify

- its major benefits
- what could have been done differently
- what could have been improved
- what worked well
- what are the lessons to learn

- was the accountability regime proportionate?

2 *Our approach*

2.1 We collected data on the planning and management of the initiative from HEFCE's files. We then approached each institution for current data on their student numbers and other matters, and arranged to visit each of them. Our visits to the institutions concerned took place between August and October 2004, and each involved interviews with the academic, managerial and other staff concerned. Where possible, we also met students on the programme, or who had recently graduated from it. We are grateful to the staff and students concerned for their assistance. We also appreciate the written submissions from, or interviews with, the Universities' China Committee in London, the China-Britain Business Council and the British Association for Chinese Studies.

2.2 Resources did not permit us to visit institutions which had submitted unsuccessful bids under the initiative, nor those which since 1999 have developed, or are developing, Chinese studies without special HEFCE support, notably the Universities of Nottingham and Bristol. (Nottingham falls into both categories.) This would form a useful supporting study, examining the extent to which Chinese studies have developed in these settings and thus providing a comparative perspective on the HEFCE-funded developments considered here.

3 *General observations*

3.1 Our overall conclusion is that this programme achieved mixed results. It achieved its primary objective of quite quickly expanding the provision of postgraduate conversion courses in Chinese language with another subject. The universities which received funding under the programme used it effectively, generally displaying organisational efficiency and flexibility in planning and implementing the new provision. A range of courses was developed, with varied modes of provision, academic specialisations, and fee levels. The pluralistic strengths of UK higher education were well-exhibited. HEFCE management of the programme was appropriately "light touch", and did not place undue burdens on the institutions taking part. Given the time-frame within which the study was conducted, over the

summer period, our contacts with students and “end-users” were relatively limited: however, the feedback that we did receive on course design and quality was strongly positive.

3.2 The initiative channelled just over £5m into the seven institutions (though the full cost of the expanded provision was higher, as institutions in effect supplemented the grant through overhead costs). But student numbers on the programmes were, and remain, relatively small: the unit costs of producing these graduates are therefore high. Though the point is strictly beyond our remit, it is hard to believe that such small numbers of graduates will have a noticeable impact on the UK’s ability to do business with China in the foreseeable future. Nor were there clear signs of actual demand from business for such graduates: most are not, it seems, working for UK firms on China-related matters. (This is not of course to say that they are not making useful contributions in other areas.) Also, while the programme as designed was well-managed by all concerned, there were ways we think the programme design overall could have been improved.

3.3 Only two institutions, Leeds and SOAS, are recruiting more than 20+ FTE students on their new programmes. Even these levels are below those predicted in their bids: SOAS estimated recruitment of 55 students by 2002-03, compared with the 38 actually achieved a year later (the majority of whom are overseas students). Cambridge and Sheffield have come reasonably close to meeting their targets for 2003-04. Oxford exceeded its target of 10, recruiting 11 students. The other institutions are recruiting well below the levels they predicted in their bids: Newcastle, for example, predicted a build-up to 16 full-time masters students plus 28 diploma students: latest figures show 5 students recruited.

3.4 Generally, we are not convinced that this programme represented the right way to expand Chinese studies in the UK. A sudden injection of cash into a small (in terms of staff and student numbers) subject area, to be spent within a tight timescale, is likely to lead to inefficient development. The individual choices made by the universities before the introduction of the initiative, not to expand their Chinese provision significantly, seems to have been shown to have been largely a sensible one, considered in terms of student demand. A smaller and slower expansion - perhaps one with about half of the new places provided - might have offered better value for money.

3.5 There is perhaps here a wider point about centrally-planned interventions in an essentially market-focused system. Expansion of provision in one field by a planned intervention may generate some new demand, as has happened in this case. But central intervention usually sits uneasily in an otherwise market-oriented system, as suppliers, here

the universities, attempt to cope with conflicting messages about demand. In this case, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that a misallocation of resources has occurred as a result of the interpretation of these conflicting messages by the universities concerned. The new funding probably reduced the perceived risk of undertaking new developments, and as a result led to over-expansion.

4 Organisation of the programme

4.1 The theoretical model underlying the organisation of the programme was, it seems, that of firms operating in a competitive market. By asking a selection of contractors to tender, the client in this environment is more likely to obtain the least-cost, highest-quality product (or at least, a satisfactory trade-off between the two). But we suggest that the conditions of a competitive market hardly applied in this case: the costs of all the contractors are very similar and in the short-run (as here) effectively fixed; barriers to entry to the market are high; demand is limited and relatively price-inelastic; and scope for innovation in design and production is at best marginal. Moreover, and crucially, the design of the programme meant that individual suppliers lacked the information about supply and demand which would normally be available in a competitive market.

4.2 The programme would, it seems to us, have worked more effectively if it had been designed to allow signals on supply and demand to guide contractors: this would, however, be incompatible with the simple tendering model adopted.

4.3 As a result, the overall organisation of the programme was widely considered by the universities taking part to be unsatisfactory in several respects. The criticisms arose mainly from the fact that all the universities involved were required to start their programmes at more or less the same time. This meant that there was a sudden, unprecedented, upturn in the demand for suitable academic staff, as all the universities needed to recruit from the same rather small talent pool - even allowing for the global nature of the academic profession (certainly this element of it). We received differing views on the question of staff recruitment: some universities had difficulties, others experienced no problems. This may relate to the standards demanded in different universities.

4.4 Similarly, potential students found themselves suddenly confronted with a larger number of masters programmes, albeit with rather similar structures and contents, where few

had previously existed. It is not therefore surprising that student recruitment for all institutions was difficult in the early years, until the market became somewhat more developed. It remains extremely circumscribed.

4.5 The simultaneous start meant that there was little scope for the Chinese departments involved to learn from each other's successes and failures and thus to proceed more effectively.

4.6 These difficulties could have at least partly overcome in various ways. The programme could have had a staggered start, with universities beginning their programmes at intervals of say two years. (The later starters would benefit from a more developed student market, and by being able to learn from the experiences of the earlier starters, arguably offsetting the advantage of the pioneers being able to establish themselves with fewer competitors.) Or some form of staged, open bidding process would have allowed universities to see what others were proposing, and to develop their own bids differently as a result. In any event, any similar future programme should aim to compensate for the lack of information for bidders created by the absence of market signals.

4.7 Another view put to us was that the available resources had been spread too thinly, and that it would have been better to concentrate resources on building up a few, world-class centres of excellence, or even a single national centre. It was argued that this applied particularly to library resources, where the cost of materials (the example of the Chinese regional gazetteers - the statistical yearbooks - was often mentioned) meant that the UK lacked a single, excellent library in this field. Although in principle cooperation amongst libraries should mitigate this problem, through agreements on complementary acquisitions policies (which we were assured were in place), in practice it failed, apparently, to solve the problem.

4.8 We were unconvinced by the argument for even greater concentration. The subject is already quite concentrated, considering China's growing significance, and it is open to any of the major universities involved to decide that they will indeed become a (even stronger) world-class centre, and allocate their own resources accordingly. (This appears to be happening in the developments in Chinese studies under way at the Universities of Nottingham and Bristol, not funded by this programme.) The current programme should have provided universities with the management information on which to base such a decision. Taxing the whole higher education system to develop a single (or a few) national centres would not only go against the grain of national higher education policy of the last decade or

more, it would undermine those institutions working in an entrepreneurial way to develop their own strengths. Another possibility, suggested to us, was for HEFCE to have encouraged greater flexibility and diversity, so that each centre could have built different specialisms, drawing on its strengths and market intelligence. Also, perhaps undergraduate programmes should not have been ruled out as recipients of funding from the initiative.

5 *University academic structures*

5.1 The need to provide programmes which combined a traditional feature of an Oriental Studies department - Chinese language - with a subject usually found elsewhere in the university - business studies, say - led to some organisational restructuring. At Leeds, the Centre for China Business and Development was created as a joint venture between the Department of East Asian Studies and the Business School, and operates the MA programme in Chinese with Business. Both the East Asian Studies and the Business School academics are pleased with the venture, which is generating new joint research activities and other synergies. A broadly similar initiative occurred at SOAS, drawing on University of London business school expertise from nearby Birkbeck College.

5.2 The University of Durham in August 2004 merged its Department of East Asian Studies with political science and area studies work to form a new School of Government and International Relations, which incorporates the pre-existing Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies. The HEFCE-funded staff had been appointed to work on Chinese studies in the departments of Politics and Business Studies, so the merger has not affected them or their programmes directly, with Chinese language teaching now coming from the Language Centre. However, the merger means that courses containing only Chinese language and area studies have now closed.

5.3 At other universities, however, no restructuring took place, but collaboration was developed between the lead department with the China expertise and departments of economics, politics, history and so on. In some such cases, new academic posts were jointly funded between the collaborating departments (as at Oxford, for example), or specialist posts were established in the lead department (as at Cambridge and Sheffield). Of course, many undergraduate and postgraduate programmes are delivered in a perfectly satisfactory way on this basis, though it is probably marginally less likely to lead to research collaboration and other academic developments. We heard reports that at Cambridge, the collaboration between

the Faculty of Oriental Studies and the other faculties involved in joint teaching was sometimes less than satisfactory, apparently because of a lack of “ownership” of the new joint programmes on the part of the latter.

6 *Student demand for the programmes*

6.1 After a slow start, some of the programmes are now recruiting satisfactorily, with students of a generally good calibre, according to the academics involved. Others, however, are doing rather poorly, notably at Newcastle, Sheffield (except the distance-learning version) and Cambridge. Fee levels are a disincentive, especially where fees well above the usual postgraduate level are charged - as at Cambridge, for example. The fee levels tend to lead to a substantial drop-out between the stage of applicants being accepted and starting the course. These problems are exacerbated to some extent by the costs of placements in China (including travel), which have to be paid by the students. Despite lower living costs in China, there will normally be net additional expenditure involved. Further, a substantial China placement tends to lengthen the programme, and so the period when students are foregoing earnings; though of course it may enhance longer-run job prospects.

6.2 Some universities would have liked the programme to have offered scholarships to students, to enable them to recruit able applicants unable to fund themselves.

6.3 Student motivation for joining the programmes varied considerably, though unsurprisingly a passion for China often figured. The desire for a business career is not wholly absent, but, from our enquiries, did not appear to be a widespread or driving motivation. It is in any case more likely that someone with this motivation would have pursued an MBA or similar route.

6.4 Significant numbers of non-UK and non-EU students are being recruited to these programmes, including students from mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. While some of these students may of course go on to work for UK companies doing business with China, this is not, we think, the student profile that the designers of the programme probably had in mind.

7 Demand by employers for students from the programmes

7.1 We were not specifically asked to review the information which led to the programme being adopted; however, as much of what followed was determined by that information, we feel that it is appropriate to comment.

7.2 The assumption of the report (HEFCE 99/09) on which the programme was based was that UK companies operating in China would be keen to recruit graduates from the kind of masters programmes which have been developed. In fact, we found little evidence to support this proposition. Of course, a UK or other Western company operating in China would, other things being equal, no doubt rather recruit a graduate who spoke Chinese rather than one who did not. But the dominant trend in Western companies operating in China, we were told, is towards localisation, supported by the fast-growing supply of able, young Chinese graduates with excellent English language skills and more knowledge about the West generally. Companies increasingly, it appears, are preferring to send these people for advanced training at a Western university, rather than to recruit Westerners. Salary levels, and the advantages of being an insider when doing business in China, were quoted as reasons. We were given the example of McKinsey & Co, which is recruiting for its Chinese operations almost exclusively from Chinese nationals with Western postgraduate qualifications.

7.3 There is of course a continuing demand for Westerners with Chinese language skills and an understanding of Chinese methods, not least to explain matters to other Westerners in terms they would understand. There is, however, probably not a direct relationship between the growth of UK/China business and the demand for graduates of the programmes involved here. We found very few cases of UK graduates being employed by Western firms operating in China; and where they were, it was not always obvious that they would not have been so employed regardless of their degree type, as the employer's demand seemed to be either for generalist postgraduate-level skills, or for a subject specialisation such as economics. An applicant with a demanding postgraduate qualification from a leading UK university would be welcomed by most international organisations seeking management talent, regardless of the specific content of their degree.

7.4 We were impressed by the distance learning initiative at Sheffield, which has recruited well from people who continue in employment, though not necessarily in jobs relating to China. However, other part-time versions of programmes, for example at Newcastle, have not fared well, perhaps because they relied too much on face-to-face teaching. We were surprised by the lack of targeting of employers who have business with

China; even the successful distance learning programme had not deliberately been marketed through employers (rather with individual potential students). There was a general lack of organised information about destinations of graduates (though this is always notoriously difficult information to obtain), and of alumni databases.

8 *Staff recruitment and the UK pool of experience*

8.1 We have mentioned that the sudden surge in demand for Chinese specialists occasioned by the start of this programme is said to have somewhat unbalanced the supply and demand equation in the academic labour market in this field. While some universities delayed filling posts by a year or so because of an unsatisfactory field of applicants, this does not appear to have been a major problem in other than the very short-run. This was in part because all universities drew significantly on Chinese nationals to fill the new posts - as language specialists, but also in fields such as business and economics. Academics from Western countries other than the UK were recruited as well.

8.2 This reflects the international nature of the academic labour market at its higher end, and casts some doubt on how realistic it is to think of the UK academic labour market as an entity. There is little in the background documents of this initiative which gives a sense of this international dimension. No doubt a further substantial expansion of UK university provision in this field could be supported by further international recruitment, which would also send market signals to actual and potential postgraduate students in the UK and abroad, so increasing future supply. The current programme has, apparently, caused some students, who began their studies for instrumental reasons, to decide that they would like to pursue a more academic approach, and it is believed that a number of potential academic staff members will result. At Oxford, for example, five graduates from the programme are undertaking advanced study in the field.

8.3 A further point raised was that, while it is possible to recruit Chinese nationals to teach in UK universities - and the pool of suitable applicants will undoubtedly grow - a quasi-security issue is involved. One element of this, it is said, is that top executives of Western companies want to discuss issues with a Western expert, not a Chinese national, however well-informed. Another is of course security in the strict sense, that Western governments will generally want their own nationals, or those of allies, to perform sensitive tasks requiring

skills in Chinese. This, essentially, is the basis for creating a home-grown cadre of China experts, rather than relying on the market to provide academics of Chinese nationality.

9 *ChinaExperts database*

9.1 The Review of Chinese Studies (HEFCE 99/09) recommended that a specialist China experts database should be established, on the grounds that it was difficult to identify those with particular expertise, as they might not be in a major Chinese studies department. We have not seen the evidence for these suppositions. A searchable database of experts on China, funded by HEFCE at a cost of some £62,000, was therefore established, after a tendering process, by the Community of Science (CoS). CoS maintains COS Expertise, 'a richly featured knowledge management system for individuals and institutions, containing more than 480,000 first-person profiles of researchers from over 1,600 institutions worldwide', <http://expertise.cos.com/>, which is accessible only by subscription. ChinaExperts is a subset of profiles from that database, of people in UK HEIs with China-related expertise. Access to that subset is from a separate website, www.chinaexperts.org.uk. Access is free of charge, at least for five years, whereafter CoS has reserved the right to make a charge for access to ChinaExperts outside the academic community. As the successor of BEST (British Expertise in Science and Technology), CoS has long-established mechanisms for collecting and updating profiles for UK academics, and HEIs are increasingly keen to market the expertise of their staff, through this and other channels. We have examined aspects of the database and have obtained some use data from CoS.

9.2 The number of profiles have increased from an initial 628 identified at the time of tender in March 2000 to 688 in October 2004. Registered users number 742 (a number which only increases, as dormant registrations are not deleted). Site visits and page views (i.e. profiles retrieved) between October 2003 and September 2004 - excluding an unexplained spike in August - averaged between 388 and 740 per month.

9.3 We are therefore not convinced that the database has represented good value for money.

10 The language component

10.1 We were rather surprised by the differing approaches taken towards the language component of the funded programmes. Competence in the Chinese language is, after all, supposed to be the defining characteristic of the graduates of these programmes. The most usual programme structure was of two years full-time study, including a significant period of time at a Chinese university, mainly studying language. This, we were told, enabled motivated students to master spoken and written Chinese sufficiently to conduct reasonably complex conversations, read newspapers and reports, and so on. This is in addition to the study of the other component of the programme: business, politics, and so on. Two-year versions, where originally planned, have however sometimes been revealed by marketing information to be unattractive to students, due to fees and lost income.

10.2 Other programmes offered a one-year programme, again with Chinese language and another subject, and claimed to achieve a broadly similar level of language achievement. Some of these programmes were aimed at students with some prior Chinese language experience, while others set their sights lower by concentrating on teaching spoken Chinese, with a small written component. It is not our task to adjudicate on these different approaches, even if we were competent to do so. It is, however, striking that such different approaches have been taken.

10.3 The conclusion we draw (see the comments on employer demand, in section 7 above) is that “getting by” in Chinese is perfectly acceptable for many jobs, and provides a basis for further learning, if required. This suggests that employers do not select applicants for their language skills as such, but, arguably, for demonstrating their ability to cope with a demanding postgraduate course of broad relevance to the employer. This is the basis for much graduate recruitment to non-specialist jobs.

11 Research

11.1 Research activity has been stimulated by the initiative, although the assessment of it is outside our competence. The fact that all the developments have been in traditionally research-intensive universities has been significant. Both the recruitment of academic staff with new interests, and interdisciplinary developments, have stimulated research activity. In the case of Leeds, for example, the enhanced link with the Business School is said to have led

to new business-focused research on China; though it is impossible to judge whether the increased salience of China for all business schools would have led to this in any event.

12 Libraries

12.1 The extra funding for library materials has, as far as we can tell, been usefully employed in strengthening collections in each centre. We have already mentioned some of the issues involved. It is difficult for non-specialists to form a view on the right balance between library collaboration and the creation of independent centres. We were told that Chinese subject librarians did pursue shared collection development policies; it seems to us likely, though, that this could be taken much further.

12.2 It is not clear to us why separate library funding was provided, rather than leaving each university to decide on the appropriate apportionment between staff and other support costs. The approach of the Chinese Studies Funding Advisory Group on library acquisitions appeared to us to take an excessively top-down view: we suggest that it is inappropriate for a central body to “advise on where [particular items of]...material should be located” for example. It appears also that HEFCE allowed itself to be drawn too much into the detail of negotiations over the China Academic Journals Database, when there was more relevant expertise in libraries in the system.

13 Sustainability

13.1 In most cases - Cambridge and Newcastle being notable exceptions - the university has made a commitment to continue the work begun by the initiative through core funding. It has been convinced of the value of the programme, in terms of student demand (even if this is below what was originally estimated), research potential, and general scholarly achievement. The HEFCE initiative has, in these terms, succeeded in changing universities' priorities in a direction intended to serve a significant national goal.

13.2 We asked universities why, if these benefits were now apparent, the university itself had not acted earlier to develop the activities in question, on the advice of its own China experts or from other sources. In most cases, the answer was that demand was not apparent

and investment was considered to be too speculative; and that organisational friction prevented the change. The new HEFCE money both reduced the perceived risk, and acted as the vital lubricant to allow change to occur. Once implemented, the changes were widely seen as beneficial, and therefore sustainable.

13.3 On the basis of limited data, we think it likely that, taking university overheads into account, the individual universities contributed to the programme by approximately 15% of full costs. It is important to bear in mind, then, that the full cost of the programme was somewhat higher than HEFCE's contribution.

Conclusions and recommendations

- 1 Centrally-planned interventions of the kind this initiative represents, in otherwise market-driven systems, may lead to a misallocation of resources. To minimise this risk, the design of the initiative should be such as to allow market signals to be provided to suppliers. This will normally be incompatible with a simple tendering model.
- 2 The demand information upon which the initiative was planned was weak: both student demand and employer demand appear more limited than was suggested.
- 3 However, the initiative has led to expanded teaching and research in Chinese studies, some of which is likely to be sustainable. To that extent, the initiative has succeeded in its overall aim.
- 4 The global and interdependent nature of academic and student markets should be more carefully considered in this type of planning.
- 5 We question the usefulness of providing earmarked library funding, rather than allowing institutions to decide on the appropriate split in their own circumstances between staff, library, and other costs of developing new programmes.
- 6 We doubt the cost-effectiveness of establishing a subscription-only database of China experts, when universities' own websites, and internet searching more generally, are becoming ever-more sophisticated.
- 7 A further study should be conducted on the development of Chinese studies since 1999 in institutions which did not receive support under this initiative. Such comparative data might provide further useful pointers as to the value of initiatives of this kind.

Annex 1: Summary of Student Recruitment under the Chinese studies programme

Part-time students are shown as 0.5 FTE. Note that ‘overseas’ students are those paying fees at the overseas rate, normally by reason of not being residents of the European Union. The figures have not been split between UK and other EU.

University	Student intake 00/01	of whom o’s seas (fee)	Student intake 01/02	of whom o’s seas (fee)	Student intake 02/03	of whom o’s seas (fee)	Student intake 03/04	of whom o’s seas (fee)	Student intake 04/05	of whom o’s seas (fee)
Cambridge	4	0	7	1	9	1	11	4	n/a	n/a
Durham	4.5	0.5	5	1	7	3	9.5	6	n/a	n/a
Leeds	10	1	13	2	24	11	20	8	n/a	n/a
Newcastle	-	-	-	-	1	-	5	1	n/a	n/a
Oxford	0	0	4	2	3	1	11	5	n/a	n/a
Sheffield	1	1	-	-	7	2	6.5	1.5	14.5	5
SOAS	-	-	17	9	25.5	18	38	22	n/a	n/a
Total	19.5	2.5	46	15	76.5	36	101	47.5		